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Recent Developments
Republic National Bank 0/ Miami v.
UnitedStates: REMOVAL OF THE
RES FROM THE DISTRICT DOES
NOT DIVEST THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF JURISDICTION IN
AN IN REM FORFEITURE ACTION.
In Republic National Bank 0/Miami v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554
(1992), the United States Supreme Court
held that in a civil forfeiture proceeding, a transfer of the res outside of the
district by the prevailing party does not
preclude the court of appeals from exercising jurisdiction over the action.
Supplementing its prior decisions with
the policy rationale of common sense
and fairness, the Court rejected the
United States Government's argument
that maintaining jurisdiction over an in
rem forfeiture claim requires continuous control over the res.
In February 1988, the Government
instituted civil forfeiture proceedings in
the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida against a
single-family home in Coral Gables.
The Government alleged that the owner
had purchased the house with proceeds
from narcotics trafficking, thereby subjecting the property to forfeiture under
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 92
Stat. 3777, (1970)(current version at
21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6». The Republic
National Bank of Miami filed an action
asserting a lien interest in the property
under a mortgage it had secured. Atthe
Government's request, the Bank agreed

to sell the home and to pennit the Marshal to retain the earnings pending determination of the action.
The district court denied the bank's
claim and forfeited the proceeds to the
United States pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
881 (a)(6). Thereafter the bank filed a
notice of appeal, but it neglected to seek
a stay of the judgment's execution to
freeze the assets. The Government·
transferred its award to the Forfeiture
Fund ofthe United States Treasury, and
then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted the Government's
motion and concluded that the removal
from the district of the proceeds from
the sale of the property defeated its in
rem jurisdiction over the action. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, citing an inconsistency among the circuits
as to the disposition on appeal of property awarded to the Government in civil
forfeiture proceedings.
In reaching its decision, the Court,
citing United States v. One Assortment
0/89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984),
recognized that a valid seizure ofthe res
is required prior to the initiation of an in
rem forfeiture proceeding. Republic
National Bank a/Miami, 113 S. Ct. at
557. The Court reasoned that the seizure of the disputed property and the
publication of the fact that proceedings
have been instituted constitutes the functional equivalent of service of process.
ld. at 557-58. The Justices, however,
declined to extend beyond the initial
determination of jurisdiction the re-

quirement that the res be seized and
maintained within the district.
The Court rejected the Government's
proposition that maintaining in rem jurisdiction requires continued control of
the res. Referring to its decision in The
Rio Grande, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 458
(1875), the Court stated that, with certain narrow exceptions, once the power
to hear a case in rem attaches, any
circumstances that arise following the
proper exercise of original jurisdiction
will not operate to divest a court of its
capacity to decide the matter. Republic
National Bank a/Miami, 113 S. Ct. at
558. Reasoning that the concept of in
rem jurisdiction was developed primarily to augment the court's ability to
hear certain cases rather than to provide
a means of defeating an adversary's
claim, the majority concluded that the
rule asserted by the Government did not
exist. Id. at 559. Accordingly, maintaining control over the res is not a
prerequisite to the continued exercise of
in rem jurisdiction.
The Court, however, did recognize
limited circumstances where the treatment of property after the institution of
an action would preclude a court from
deciding a case. In situations where the
plaintiff abandons the res or where the
property in dispute is otherwise
unobtainable, a court will not adjudicate the matter because of the inability
to enforce its decision. !d. The Court
noted that these exceptions relateexclusively to the policies of rendering only
enforceable judgments and of giving
fair notice to the parties. Id. Nonethe-
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less, such considerations did not operate to dissolve the court's power to hear
the case at bar.
The Court also rejected the
Government's contention that, because
funds deposited in the United States
Treasury may be released only by a
congressional appropriation under Art.
I, § 9, Cl. 7 of the United States Constitution, any judgment handed down
would necessarily be "useless" within
the meaning of the exception to appellate jurisdiction discussed above. Id. at
560. The Court reasoned that in 31
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) Congress has provided for the refund of funds that are
erroneously received. Id. In addition,
28 U.S.C. § 2465 states that property
seized under any act of Congress shall
be returned following the disposition of
judgment in the defendant's favor.
Under the Court's interpretation ofthese
statutes, a formal appropriation would
not be required under these circumstances. Id. at 561. Because the funds
would be returned to their rightful owner
following a favorable judgment, the
Court concluded that a decision in the
bank's favor would thus be enforceable. Id.
Justice Thomas, in a concurring
opinion, stated that he would have applied § 1521 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, 106
Stat. 3672, which amended 28 V.S.c. §
1355. Section 1521, which the President signed on October 28, 1992, provides that the removal of property by a
prevailing party in a civil forfeiture
action does not deprive the appellate
court ofjurisdiction in the matter. The
majority expressly declined to interpret
the statute or to determine its retroactive effect. Republic National Bank of
Miami, 113 S. Ct. at 560 n.5. Justice
Thomas, however, believed the Court
should have applied the principle recognized in United States v. Alabama,
362 U.S. 602 (1960), that new laws
which enlarge jurisdiction apply to cases
currently pending before a court.
Republic National Bank of Miami
v. United States represents a refusal by
the Court to curtail the right of property
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owners to appeal an adverse decision in
civil forfeiture proceedings brought by
the Government. In declining to interpret the retroactive effect of § 1521 of
the Housing and Conununity Development Act of 1992, the Court indicated
that, even absent such a statute, it would
not pernlit tl1e Government to escape a
full adjudication of a civil forfeiture
claim on technical procedural grounds.
Based on this decision, owners of property seized by the Government pursuant
to 21 V.S.C. § 881(a)(6) will beguaran teed the right to appeal a district
court ruling forfeiting title to their property to the United States.

-Scott N Alperin

Crosby v. United States: CRIMINAL TRIAL MAY NOT PROCEED
IF DEFENDANT IS NOT
PRESENT AT COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL.
In Crosby v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 748 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 43 prohibits a trial
in absentia of a defendant who is not
present at the commencement of trial.
In arriving at this holding, the Court
examined the express language, the history, and the logic of the Rule.
Michael Crosby and others were
indicted on several counts of mail fraud
by a federal grandjury in the District of
Minnesota. He and his codefendants
were accused of devising a scheme to
fraudulently sell military-veteran commemorative medallions. Crosby appeared before a federal magistrate and
pleaded not guilty. He was conditionally released from detention upon agreeing to post a bond and remain in the
state. He attended pretrial conferences
and hearings with his attorney and was
advised of the trial date.
Crosby, however, did not appear for
his trial in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota.
Deputy marshals attempted to locate
him but were unsuccessful. The court
expressed concern over the delay because the pool of potential jurors was
waiting and the delay could have interfered with the court's calendar. The
prosecutor noted that Crosby's attorney and codefendants were present and
that it would be difficult for her to
reschedule the case due to the age and
health problems of some of the witnesses.
The district court suggested that the
trial begin despite Crosby's absence,
and Crosby's attorney objected. TIle
Governnlent fOfl1lally requested that the
trial conunence because Crosby was
still not located after several days of
search, and Crosby's bond was forfeited.
The court stated for the record its
findings that Crosby had adequate no-

